# The Shapley Value of Database Tuples

## DBAI 2019

**Ester Livshits**, Leopoldo Bertossi, Benny Kimelfeld, Moshe Sebag

To appear in ICDT 2020

# ML Workflow



- Why provenance [Buneman+01,Green+07]
- Responsibility / causality / resilience [Meliou+10,15]

- Sensitivity analysis [Baehrens+10]
- Taylor decomposition [Montavon+17]
- Attention models [Ross+17]
- Shapley value [Lundberg&Lee17]

# ML Workflow



- Why provenance [Buneman+01,Green+07]
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- Shapley value [Livshits+19]

- Sensitivity analysis [Baehrens+10]
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# Shapley Value

➢ A widely known profit-sharing formula in cooperative game theory

➢ Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953

➢ Applied in various areas beyond cooperative game theory:
  - ❖ Pollution responsibility in environmental management
  - ❖ Influence measurement in social network analysis
  - ❖ Identifying candidate autism genes
  - ❖ Bargaining foundations in economics
  - ❖ Takeover corporate rights in law
  - ❖ Explanations in machine learning

➢ Received little attention in data management

# Shapley Value

Set $A$ of players:

Wealth function $v \colon \mathcal{P}(A) \to \mathbb{R}$:

How to distribute the total wealth among the players?

# Shapley Value

$$\text{Shapley}(A, v, a) = \sum_{B \subseteq A \setminus \{a\}} \frac{|B|!\,(|A| - |B| - 1)!}{|A|!} \big(v(B \cup \{a\}) - v(B)\big)$$

**+4**

2

7

21

25

The Shapley value is the expected delta due to the addition in a random permutation

# ML as a Coalition Game



Wealth function $\nu$

Data → Features → Model → Prediction

Feature values

Players?

# ML as a Coalition Game

Wealth function $\nu$

Prediction ✓ ✗

Data → Features → Model → Prediction

Tuples

Players?

# Shapley Value for Database Queries

➤ **Goal:** quantify the contribution of tuples to query results

| AUTHOR | |
|---|---|
| **Name** | **Affiliation** |
| Alice | UCLA |
| Bob | NYU |
| Cathy | UCSD |
| David | MIT |
| Ellen | UCSD |

| INSTITUTE | |
|---|---|
| **Name** | **STATE** |
| UCLA | CA |
| UCSD | CA |
| NYU | NY |
| MIT | MA |

| PUBLICAION | |
|---|---|
| **Author** | **Paper** |
| Alice | A |
| Alice | B |
| Bob | C |
| Cathy | C |
| Cathy | D |
| David | C |

| CITATIONS | |
|---|---|
| **PAPER** | **CITS** |
| A | 18 |
| B | 2 |
| C | 8 |
| D | 12 |

Players

$$q(z,w){:}-AUTHOR(x,y), PUBLICATION(x,z), CITATIONS(z,w)$$

$$\text{SUM}_w\langle q(z,w)\rangle$$    ⟵ Wealth function

$$SV(Alice) = 20$$
$$SV(Cathy) = 14.67$$
$$SV(Bob) = 2.67$$
$$SV(David) = 2.67$$
$$SV(Ellen) = 0$$

# Boolean Conjunctive Queries

| **Theorem (Dichotomy for Conjunctive Queries)** |
|---|
| Let $q$ be a Boolean CQ without self-joins. |
|     o  If $q$ is hierarchical, then $\mathrm{Shapley}(D, q, f)$ can be computed in **PTIME**. |
|     o  Otherwise, the problem is $FP^{\#P}$**-complete**. |

> A CQ $q$ is **hierarchical** if for every two variables $x$ and $y$:

   ❖ $Atoms(x) \subseteq Atoms(y)$ or

   ❖ $Atoms(y) \subseteq Atoms(x)$ or

   ❖ $Atoms(x) \cap Atoms(y) = \emptyset$

$$q_1(): -R(x, y), S(x, z) \quad \checkmark$$

$$Atoms(x) = \{R(x, y), S(x, z)\}$$
$$Atoms(y) = \{R(x, y)\}$$
$$Atoms(z) = \{S(x, z)\}$$

# Boolean Conjunctive Queries

| **Theorem (Dichotomy for Conjunctive Queries)** |
|---|
| Let $q$ be a Boolean CQ without self-joins. <br>     o If $q$ is hierarchical, then $\mathrm{Shapley}(D, q, f)$ can be computed in **PTIME**. <br>     o Otherwise, the problem is $FP^{\#P}$**-complete**. |

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$$q_2():-R(x), S(x,y), T(y)$$ ❌

$$Atoms(x) = \{R(x), S(x,y)\}$$
$$Atoms(y) = \{S(x,y), T(y)\}$$

# Boolean Conjunctive Queries

| Theorem (Dichotomy for Conjunctive Queries) |
|---|
| Let $q$ be a Boolean CQ without self-joins. <br>     ◦ If $q$ is hierarchical, then $\mathrm{Shapley}(D, q, f)$ can be computed in **PTIME**. <br>     ◦ Otherwise, the problem is $FP^{\#P}$**-complete**. |

➢ Same classification criteria as for query answering over probabilistic databases [Dalvi and Suciu 2004]

➢ Can be easily extended to general CQs

# Aggregate Queries

➢ The Shapley value is a probabilistic expectation

➢ Using the linearity of expectation, we extend our dichotomy to SUM

| **Theorem (Dichotomy for SUM)** |
|---|
| Let $\alpha$ be an arbitrary summation over a CQ $q$ without self-joins.<br>    o If $q$ is hierarchical, then $\text{Shapley}(D, \alpha, f)$ can be computed in **PTIME**.<br>    o Otherwise, the problem is $FP^{\#P}$**-complete**. |

$$q(z,w) \colon {-} AUTHOR(x,y), PUBLICATION(x,z), CITATIONS(z,w)$$

$$\text{SUM}_w \langle q(z,w) \rangle$$

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$$q(z, w) :- AUTHOR(x, y), PUBLICATION(x, z), CITATIONS(z, w), INST(y,' CA')$$

$$\text{SUM}_w \langle q(z, w) \rangle$$

# Aggregate Queries

> Our hardness result applies to any non-constant numerical query

| **Theorem (Hardness for Numerical Queries)** |
|---|
| Let $\alpha$ be a non-constant numerical query over a CQ $q$ without self-joins. If $q$ is non-hierarchical, then computing $\mathrm{Shapley}(D, \alpha, f)$ is $FP^{\#P}$**-complete**. |

$$q(z, w) :- AUTHOR(x, y), PUBLICATION(x, z), CITATIONS(z, w), INST(y,' CA')$$

$$\mathrm{MAX_w}\langle q(z, w)\rangle$$
$$\mathrm{MIN_w}\langle q(z, w)\rangle$$
$$\mathrm{AVG_w}\langle q(z, w)\rangle$$

# Approximation

➢ Computing the Shapley value is often hard

➢ But the picture is far more positive when allowing approximation

| Theorem |
| --- |
| For every fixed BCQ, the Shapley value has a multiplicative fully-polynomial randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS).<br><br>$$\Pr\left[\frac{f(x)}{1+\epsilon} \leq A(x, \epsilon, \delta) \leq (1+\epsilon)f(x)\right] \geq 1 - \delta$$ |

➢ Generalizes to unions of CQs and summations over CQs

# Concluding Remarks

➢ We investigated the problem of quantifying the contribution of database tuples to query results via the Shapley value

➢ Related measures:
  ❖ Causal responsibility [Meliou et al. 2010]
    ○ Not extendable to aggregate queries
  ❖ Causal effect [Salimi et al. 2016]
    ○ We show that it coincides with the Banzhaf Power Index [Banzhaf 1965]
    ○ Our complexity results extend to this measure

# Concluding Remarks

➢ Open problems:
  ❖ CQs with self joins $(q(): -R(x, y), R(y, z))$
  ❖ Extend our understanding of aggregates over CQs
  ❖ Approximation for non-monotonic queries
  ❖ Detecting sets of tuples with a high Shapley group value

# Thank you for listening!

## Questions?